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Abstract: Chapman & Huffman suggest that we might change people’s behavior toward animals
by resisting an argument that because humans are intellectually superior to animals, they are also
morally superior to animals. C & H try to show that the premise is false: Humans are not
intellectually superior. Several commentators have resisted this response. We suggest that there
are other ways of attacking the argument: The notion of moral superiority on which the argument
relies is dubious, and the obvious ways of reformulating the argument are instances of the
“naturalistic fallacy.”
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Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H) aim to promote better treatment of non-human animals and
the preservation of biodiversity by rebutting an argument that they think has been used to
“justify human cruelty” (p. 4). A simple version of the argument would run as follows:
Premise: Humans are intellectually superior to non-human animals.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, humans are morally superior to animals.
Conclusion 2: Therefore, it is morally permissible for humans to (e.g.) kill animals, destroy
their habitat, and so on.
There are several lines of response to this argument in C & H’s target article, but perhaps the
most prominent is that the premise is false: “Many human traits once thought unique to our
species have proved to differ only in degree from those of many other species living on the
planet.” C & H claim that recognising the continuity between humans and other animals “will
allow us to make decisions — such as whether to use palm oil or how high on the food chain to
eat — with a realistic understanding of the consequences of our actions, for them as well as for
us.” This will hence presumably change our behaviour.
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Let’s suppose that C & H are right: something like this argument does underlie much
thinking about animals; so, responding to it is a good way to motivate the kinds of change in our
behaviour that C & H persuasively suggest are necessary. There are still important questions
about rhetorical strategy: What is the best way to rebut the argument? What response is most
likely to convince people to reject the argument and change their behaviour? C & H question the
premise; but many commentators have called their reasoning into question, with several
expressing the opinion that it is “obvious” (Ng 2019) that humans are in some sense intellectually
superior (Juergens 2018, Iotchev and Costa 2019, Johansen 2019, Paez 2019, Vonk 2019, Wilson
and Lehman 2019, Woodruff 2019). We are inclined to think that these commentators have a
point; but even if they are wrong, the fact that many people are so attracted to this thought
shows that C & H’s strategy for responding to the argument may not succeed, and that it is worth
looking for alternatives.
One possibility is to call into question the notion of moral superiority on which the
argument relies. What sort of thing is moral superiority? The superiority of one thing to another
is always a matter of the extent to which the two things possess some gradable quality. For
example, we might regard one car as superior to another if it accelerates more quickly. In that
case, we would be comparing the two cars with respect to their respective abilities to accelerate;
and the ability to accelerate is a quality that a car can have to a greater or a lesser extent.
Alternatively, we might regard one car as superior to another if it is cheaper. In that case, we
would be comparing the two cars with respect to their respective low prices; and low price is a
quality that a car can have to a greater or lesser extent.
If the idea of moral superiority makes any sense, there must be a gradable moral quality;
that is, a quality that individuals can have to a greater or lesser extent, and the extent to which
they have it determines how they must and may be treated. We suggest that it is by no means
clear that there is any such quality (Sachs 2011, 2018).
True, some traditional views in moral philosophy endorsed the idea of moral qualities of
this kind. For example, the “Great Chain of Being” (GCB) — a once-popular understanding of
God’s ordering of nature — could be understood as proposing that the gradable moral quality is
belovedness-by-God. But we take it that few now would want to endorse the theological burdens
of the GCB. In any case, if moral superiority is based on the GCB, then the argument fails unless
God loves things precisely to the extent that they are intelligent. So, if we reject the GCB, then
we need to look for an alternative gradable moral quality. It is just not clear what such a quality
could be.
It would be possible simply to define the notion of moral superiority in terms of what
actions are permissible or impermissible. For example, we might simply stipulate that x is morally
superior to y if it is morally permissible for x to kill y, destroy y’s habitat, and so on. But if we do
this, it is obvious that Conclusion 1 (humans are morally superior to animals) plays no role in the
argument. In that case, the argument could be restated more concisely like this:
Premise: Humans are intellectually superior to animals.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is morally permissible for humans to (e.g.) kill animals, destroy
their habitat, and so on.
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Restating the argument this way reveals it for what it is: an instance of the naturalistic fallacy
(i.e., trying to derive what is right and wrong from facts of nature) (Sinclair 2018), in that it
purports to derive a normative claim — in this case a claim about what is morally permissible or
morally required — from purely non-normative premises. The past three centuries of moral
philosophy suggest that no such argument can be valid (Hume 1739/2000: Book 3, Part 1).
We therefore agree with C & H that the argument is problematic. But if we think that
convincing people that the argument is problematic can play a role in changing their behaviour,
we should consider what response is most convincing. We have suggested here that two such
strategies are worth considering: questioning the notion of moral superiority on which the
argument relies, and revealing the argument to be an instance of the naturalistic fallacy.
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